Stefan Zweig wrote about the “Europe of the Spirit” recognized in his differences. Today it is mainly recognized in his fractures. Robert Fico’s phrase – “I will never be prime minister of war” – not just a domestic gesture for Slovakia. It is the inscription of half of Epirus that no longer sees Russia’s defeat as a goal, but to stop the war as an end on its own.他在公共電視上這樣做，重申他不會帶領國家進行“軍事冒險”，首要任務是“迅速結束戰爭”。 It’s political – and it’s a symptom.
Shortly two weeks ago, Andrej Babiš’s victory in the Czech Republic unified the other pillar of this new axis of Central Europe.巴比什獲勝並開啟了組建政府的談判，而總統彼得·帕維爾則敦促他維持捷克對烏克蘭的彈藥計劃——總統的戰略謹慎與他的新政治之間的衝突等待著總統的摩擦。 Although Babiš is called “realistic” and pro-eu/NATO, his campaign was characterized by a criticism of military support for Kiev. And, in order to rule, he must negotiate with forces that are more cautious about Ukraine. It is the Czech Republic that again discovers the History Center – and Europe that measures the price of its own division.
One – from Baltic to Warsaw – lives the war on its nerves.他認為俄羅斯的威脅是一種自然的可能性，並將安全轉化為威懾、防空和軍事工業：恐懼變成了一種學說。另一個國家——從大西洋到地中海——觀察著這場衝突，但懷著道德信念：它支持烏克蘭，將其視為歐洲的義務，願意花費必要的資金來證明這一點，即使沒有感到排斥。 Between the two, an intermediate Europe – from Prague to Budapest – leans against Russian energy border, balancing addictions and tests a 停止: “Finish the war quickly”, no “defeat Russia”.我可以直言不諱地說。 Babiš gives a critical mass. Orbán gives him a language.
如果歐洲計劃是一種通用語法，那麼安全保障現在就用方言來書寫——每個人都流露出不同的恐懼，而不僅僅是戰略上的恐懼。
與此同時，其他人佔據了調解桌。 Erdogan has kept channels open in Moscow and KIEB and repeats that he wants peace “with all parties sitting”. Donald Trump did diplomacy “電纜“從安克雷奇到戰斧和核控制談判的一個階段，試圖達成一項“大協議”，對許多歐洲人來說，這可能會超出我們的頭腦做出決定。 自營出口商。 And that is what Europe has done, in the name of impeccable moral discourse – but politically inadequate.
The paradox is simple: Europe is right to say that the borders are not negotiable under pressure and that Ukraine deserves defense, sovereignty and the future.當歐洲將戰略這個詞與戰略混淆時，就會犯錯誤。 The strategy requires two pieces, simultaneous and reliable: material capacity, so that Kiev does not lose ammunition, air defense, European production, energy resistance. And the diplomatic architecture, so that Moscow can only win by stopping – that is, a pressure of + output, with European envoys accepted on both sides, gradual commands and clear motives/sanctions.沒有它，“和平”仍然是第三方的俘虜，戰爭一旦停止，就會停止對我們的攻擊。
有些人回應說你不與那些轟炸的人談判。這是可以理解的。 But one always negotiates with enemies, not with friends.有了這些峰。 The question is who determines the terms.就華盛頓-莫斯科（或安卡拉-莫斯科）問題而言，歐洲將為此付出兩次代價：預算和安全，脆弱的邊界和毀滅性的前邊界。成熟的歐洲需要一個 歐洲和平軸心
這需要三個艱難的決定。
第一：不要轉布拉格、布拉迪斯拉發和布達佩斯。 Incorporate them into a minimal consensus (defense of the European space, continuation of defense aid in Kiev, explicit red lines) and give them a place in the diplomatic architecture – without a “moral veto”, but with strategic surveillance.第二：將歐洲國防工業-波利尼西亞合同、財團市場、專業化製度化 集群 – so that the military capacity does not depend on the American political circle.第三：按照歐洲理事會的命令，任命兩名特使（弗里德里希·梅爾茨和喬治亞·梅洛尼）在莫斯科和基輔開闢渠道——制定時間表、階段和明確的條件，即在一切都達成一致之前不會達成任何協議。
The danger, if we do nothing, is double.在內部，因為歐洲的“和平”半壁江山，加上社會疲勞，將破壞巴比什捷克共和國、菲科的斯洛伐克、歐爾班的匈牙利以及德國或德國可能發生的情況的有利於烏克蘭的共識。外部，因為其他人定義的停火將我們凍結在戰爭之間：沒有安全保障，沒有金融重建，並且俄羅斯為下一次重演贏得了時間。 The “peace of other people” is rarely ours.
